46. A Response to Ambassador Larry André: Why America Should Recognise Somaliland Now

46. A Response to Ambassador Larry André: Why America Should Recognise Somaliland Now

A Case for American Leadership and Legal Clarity

Ambassador (ret) Larry André's recent analysis of Somaliland recognition fundamentally misunderstands both the legal foundations of Somaliland's statehood and America's strategic interests in the Horn of Africa. His approach treats a functioning democracy as if it were merely another failed region of Somalia, ignoring decades of legal scholarship and the clear precedents of international law that support recognition.

Disclosure and Context Matter

Before addressing the substantive issues, transparency requires noting that Ambassador André is a registered Foreign Agent Registration Act (FARA) representative for Hormuud Telecom Somalia Inc., the largest Somalia-based telecommunications company. This relationship, documented in public FARA filings, creates a direct financial interest in maintaining Somalia's territorial claims over Somaliland. Such conflicts of interest should be disclosed when discussing policy that directly affects his client's business interests.

Furthermore, the Ambassador's choice to feature himself wearing the Somalia's flag at a war memorial in his blog post demonstrates a fundamental insensitivity to Somaliland's experience. For Somalilanders, this flag represents the regime that conducted genocidal campaigns against the Isaaq clan in 1988, killing an estimated 50,000-200,000 civilians. If you wear such clothing in Somaliland today, you will be arrested. This is not merely a political symbol; it represents the flag used to bomb Somaliland cities, with war monuments showing Somali Air Force planes that took off from Hargeisa to attack Hargeisa itself. Wearing such symbolism whilst discussing Somaliland's future is not merely tone-deaf; it's a provocative troll post that reveals the Ambassador's true intentions.

The False Foundation: "Historic Somalia" vs Reality

Ambassador André repeatedly references "historic Somalia," but this framing is fundamentally dishonest. What he calls "historic Somalia" is actually "Hillary Somalia"; a state that Hillary Clinton prematurely recognised in 2012-2013 based on the mistaken belief that Somalia was winning against Al-Shabaab. After Somalia's 1991 collapse, the United States withdrew all recognition of any Somali government. The current Federal Government of Somalia is Hillary Clinton's creation, not a continuation of any historic entity.

This matters because the Ambassador is asking America to defer to an entity that exists only because of Hillary Clinton's foreign policy mistake; a "government" that has failed to defeat Al-Shabaab but instead spends its energy fighting Somaliland's recognition.

The Legal Foundation: No Union Ever Existed

Ambassador André claims to want policy based on "relevant facts" but immediately presents a fundamental legal fiction. He states there was a "voluntary unification" between British Somaliland and Italian Somaliland in 1960. This is categorically false, and the African Union's own fact-finding mission confirmed it.

The 1960 Union Was Legally Invalid

Historical records and legal analysis conclusively demonstrate that no valid union ever existed:

The rush to unite them despite Somaliland's rejection occurred because, as US archives show, there was doubt that any Somali nation would survive independently. Ironically, this proved true for Somalia but not for Somaliland, which has demonstrated greater sovereignty than several recognised states today. This fact alone requires review of US policy since 1960.

Historical US Policy Supports Self-Determination

US policy toward Djibouti at the time explicitly stated that Djibouti could join a Somali union "if the people of Djibouti agreed to that." The union of Somali-speaking peoples was always conditional on their consent. Since there are now three Somali-speaking countries (Somalia, Somaliland, Djibouti), and we understand Djibouti as politically and culturally distinct, the same logic applies to Somaliland.

Self-Determination, Not Consultation Theatre

Ambassador André calls for "great care and consultation" whilst fundamentally misunderstanding how state recognition works in international law. As a democracy, America respects self-determination (exercised 26 June 1960), and the highest priority must be the democratically expressed voices within Somaliland itself.

The problem with Somalia is that it lacks sovereignty and needs everyone's approval for any decision. Somaliland is sovereign and doesn't need the same failed playbook. Recognition is, by design, a unilateral decision by sovereign states. There is nothing in international law that prohibits a country from recognising another state.

The United States has never always waited for regional consensus before recognising states, yet Ambassador André suggests treating Somaliland differently; requiring approval from failed states and authoritarian regimes.

"Do No Harm" Requires Recognition, Not Continued Punishment

Ambassador André invokes "do no harm" whilst ignoring the massive harm that non-recognition inflicts upon Somaliland's 6 million citizens. We are already doing major harm to Somaliland people. For 35 years, Somalilanders have been punished with:

Ambassador André admits Americans won't suffer from Horn of Africa destabilisation, but Somalilanders are already suffering. The suffering of Somalilanders is larger, longer, and more devastating than any emotional damage to Somalia from recognising something that was never legally part of it.

The Consultation Fallacy: Failed States Have No Expertise

Ambassador André's recommended consultations reveal his narrow, failed-state bubble. He praises African Union commissioners like Mahamoud Ali Youssouf and Mohamed El-Amine Souef as "experts" whilst ignoring that these are people who have failed to counter Al-Shabaab, which rules the majority of Somalia. These people and the countries they represent are failures. The whole international community has failed in Somalia.

There is no Al-Shabaab in Somaliland, so there is no expertise needed from these failed interventions. Many of Ambassador André's suggested "partners" have fundamental issues:

This represents the fundamental problem with putting everyone else first instead of America First. When we prioritise Turkey, Djibouti, and other failing states, we end up serving Chinese Communist Party interests rather than American values.

Somaliland is a democracy where American interests can have a fresh start. It's a completely different model from the "let's involve everyone to fight Al-Shabaab" approach that requires compromising our values. That story doesn't apply to Somaliland.

The Ambassador's Compromised Experience

It's worth noting that Ambassador André spent only 15 months in Somalia before retiring; hardly a success story. This position is typically where America sends people about to retire, not its brightest diplomats. Somalia is the world's most corrupt place, a dysfunctional posting where it's easy to corrupt people's minds. Imagine being sent to Eritrea and then asked to analyse Ethiopia; this is the logical disconnect we see when someone assigned to a failed state is asked to comment on a successful one.

The Ambassador can discuss Somalia all day, but being assigned to one country and then commenting on another represents a fundamental misunderstanding of different political systems and cultures.

Ridiculous Claims About Security Contributions

One of Ambassador André's most outrageous assertions is that "Somaliland benefits from the efforts of Somalia forces and their international security partners in containing Al-Shabaab." This is absurd for multiple reasons:

First, he simultaneously claims that Somaliland recognition gains momentum when Somalia fails, yet now argues Somalia is succeeding in containing Al-Shabaab. The logic is incoherent; they couldn't defeat Al-Shabaab but succeeded enough that Somaliland should be grateful?

Second, Somaliland independently prevented piracy on its coastline; the most lucrative maritime territory for such activity. Somaliland stopped various terrorist organisations from establishing themselves, not through international intervention but through its own people's nationalism and love of country. Different political culture, different results.

If Somaliland were recognised today, it would be definitively defeating Al-Shabaab and piracy by example; showing that competent governance works. This claim that Somaliland should thank failed international efforts for its own security achievements is genuinely laughable.

In fact, Somalia's Prime Minister Hamza Bare himself admitted that they could not defeat Al-Shabaab because they were too busy with Somaliland. Taking Somaliland off their table would give them the focus to do their actual work (after some short tantrums). Somalia's own leadership acknowledges that their obsession with Somaliland undermines their counter-terrorism efforts and not the other way around.

Clan Politics: Successful Complexity Management

Ambassador André's extensive focus on clan dynamics reveals his Somalia-centric bias and fundamental misunderstanding of Somaliland's achievements. He portrays Somaliland as if it were simply one clan (Isaaq) dominating others, but this is factually wrong and attacks Somaliland's national identity.

Somaliland was governed for eight years by a non-Isaaq president (Dahir Riyale Kahin) in a population that is 70-80% Isaaq; demonstrating remarkable political maturity and inclusivity that exceeds most established democracies. The British signed five separate treaties with different Somaliland clans, recognising the multi-clan composition from the beginning, not single Isaaq clan.

We don't refer to these groups as "minorities"; each clan constitutes a majority in their traditional territories, and they've lived in harmony for decades. Unlike Somalia's federal model where similar-sized groups like Majerteen (equivalent to Habar Awal) would have separate Federal states, Somaliland's various clans choose unity under a strongly developing national identity.

Ambassador André's obsession with delegitimising this successful clan integration by treating it as inherently unstable represents an attack on Somaliland's national fabric and achievements. More fundamentally, he wants to compare the progress of recognised clan federalism (Somalia's model) to civic nationalism (Somaliland's model) whilst denying Somaliland the recognition that would level the playing field. It would be far more fair to give Somaliland recognition first, then compare which system delivers better results for its people, a game Somaliland is already winning.

Where does he get the idea that Awdal is not pro-Somaliland? This is not policy analysis; it's an assault on Somaliland sovereignty designed to please his telecommunications company clients.

The United States should deal with Somaliland as a state through its elected representatives, not micromanage clan relationships. Such paternalistic colonial-era thinking has no place in modern diplomacy.

Recognition Timeline: Success Drives Interest, Not Failure

Contrary to Ambassador André's claims, Somaliland recognition momentum rises not when Somalia fails, but when Somaliland succeeds. The highest international attention came from:

These represent Somaliland's proactive diplomacy, not reactions to Somali failures.

Legal Precedent: Baltic States, Not African Secessions

Ambassador André incorrectly suggests that East African precedents (Eritrea, South Sudan) apply to Somaliland, demonstrating his unfamiliarity with international law. Somaliland's case follows the Baltic states precedent: restoration of illegally terminated independence, not secession from a functioning state.

When Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia declared independence in 1991, the United States recognised this as restoration of pre-existing statehood, explicitly stating that these nations' legal personality had never been lost during illegal occupation. This is precisely Somaliland's legal position:

The African Union's colonial borders principle (uti possidetis juris) actually supports this analysis, since Somaliland's claimed territory corresponds exactly to British Somaliland Protectorate boundaries established in 1884.

The False Choice of Federalism

Ambassador André concludes by suggesting creative federalism solutions. This fundamentally misunderstands the situation; and reveals dangerous historical ignorance.

His comparison to the 50 US states is particularly problematic. Somaliland gained legal personality in 1960, after the 1945 UN Charter prohibited annexation by force. Many US states were annexed before this prohibition existed. What Ambassador André advocates; forcing a recognised state into a larger entity against its will; is actually similar to what Russia is attempting with Ukraine.

In essence, Ambassador André argues from the side of the 1988 genocide perpetrators, advocating that the victims should submit to their former oppressors. This position must be condemned by any civilised analysis.

Somaliland doesn't want clan federalism; it has successfully created something better. After 34 years of democratic governance, economic development, and regional stability, Somaliland has proven clan federalism unnecessary through superior performance.

The Middle Course Achieves Nothing

Ambassador André's recommended "middle course" of a diplomatic office would accomplish nothing substantive. The UK has maintained such arrangements for years with no meaningful impact. This approach:

Worse, such half-measures can be easily reversed by future administrations, as occurred when Hillary Clinton shifted US recognition from Somaliland to Somalia. If the current de facto relationship is all America offers, Somaliland might achieve better arrangements with China, which could provide similar de facto recognition with fewer restrictions.

Only full recognition creates irreversible policy that protects American interests across electoral cycles and provides Somaliland with the international standing it has earned.

Conclusion: America First Means Recognising Success

Recognition should be viewed as a win-win bilateral relationship between Hargeisa and Washington, not as requiring permission from failing third parties. Somalia has the weakest legal claim when compared to Ireland (recognised before UK consent), Bangladesh (before Pakistan), or Kosovo (before Serbia).

A democratically expressed referendum in Somaliland showed majority support for independence. Even in disputed areas like Las Anod, which left Somaliland's control, there would likely be return and integration once recognition provides economic opportunities and removes attachment to Somalia's failed state status. This has historical precedent; Las Anod previously left Somaliland for Puntland in 2003 under Dahir Riyale but returned after two years in 2005. If Somaliland gains recognition, we can expect similar movements as regions seek to join the economic boom that will follow removal of Somalia's failed state attachment.

Recognition enables the United States to hold Somaliland accountable through normal diplomatic engagement; something impossible under current ambiguous arrangements.

Ambassador André's analysis reflects the corrupted thinking that comes from decades of failed Somalia policy. Anyone involved in Somalia "state-building" has lost the mental capacity to understand how to work with a successful state like Somaliland.

The fundamental choice facing American policymakers is whether to reward 34 years of democratic success or continue subsidising failure. Somaliland represents everything America claims to support:

Somalia, despite $10+ billion in international aid, remains unable to control its territory, dependent on foreign troops, and ranked among the world's most corrupt governments.

Ambassador André's career-ending engagement with this issue; returning from retirement to advocate for a telecommunications company's interests; represents the worst of the revolving door between government service and private lobbying. His attack on Somaliland's national identity and achievements, whilst wearing the symbols of genocide, demands condemnation from serious policymakers in Somaliland.

It is time for America to recognise what the law has always shown: Somaliland is not seeking to create something new, but to restore something that was illegally taken away. Justice delayed is justice denied, and Somaliland has waited long enough.

Recognition of Somaliland represents American leadership based on legal principle, democratic values, and strategic interest. The alternative; continued deference to failed states, authoritarian regimes, and Chinese influence; serves neither American interests nor the cause of freedom in Africa.