A Response to the Single Somalia Policy Debate
Michael Rubin, Senior Fellow at the American Enterprise Institute and Director of Policy Analysis at the Middle East Forum, has been one of Somaliland's most consistent and knowledgeable advocates in Washington. His recent proposal to treat Somaliland similar to Taiwan represents a significant elevation of the policy debate, particularly when compared to the inadequate suggestion of merely establishing a US consulate in Hargeisa. Rubin understands the Horn of Africa with a depth few American analysts can match.
However, even Rubin's Taiwan model, whilst representing the best thinking currently in Washington, does not fully address the unique security imperatives of the Horn of Africa. The reality is simpler and more urgent: Somaliland needs full recognition for regional stability, and America needs to recognise Somaliland to maintain strategic relevance in one of the world's most volatile regions.
The Clinton Reversal: From Bush's Recognition Policy to Single Somalia Failure
The "Single Somalia" policy was Hillary Clinton's creation, and like much of her foreign policy legacy, it has proven catastrophic. This policy has achieved nothing beyond perpetuating instability, empowering terrorism, and handing strategic opportunities to America's competitors whilst costing US taxpayers more than 10 billion dollars.
This represented a deliberate reversal of the George W. Bush administration's policy, which favoured recognising Somaliland. The only regret expressed by Bush-era officials is that they did not push hard enough to achieve recognition. They understood that Somaliland's stability and democratic governance served American interests far better than perpetuating the fiction of Somalia.
The Single Somalia policy rests on a demonstrable fiction: that Somalia is a functioning state with legitimate claims over territories it cannot govern. For over three decades, Somaliland has demonstrated every attribute of successful statehood whilst Mogadishu has demonstrated none.
The China Factor: Why De Facto Is Not Enough
Somaliland's leadership understands a fundamental strategic reality: if all the United States offers is a de facto arrangement, China can offer a better de facto deal. This is not speculation; it is observable in China's expanding influence across Africa.
Somaliland's political culture is built on partnership and mutual respect. Somalilanders are not seeking charity or special favours; they seek recognition of the reality they have built through decades of democratic governance. They have demonstrated patience with Western partners, but this patience cannot be indefinite when rhetoric about democracy is not matched with concrete support.
China's Structural Inability and America's Unique Advantage
China can never recognise Somaliland. Beijing's entire foreign policy architecture rests on territorial integrity as an inviolable principle, driven by its concerns about Taiwan, Tibet, and Xinjiang. Ironically, Somaliland's case represents state continuity rather than secession, but this legal nuance matters little to Beijing's rigid doctrine. China will offer investment and infrastructure, but never recognition.
America, however, faces no such constraint. Recognition costs American taxpayers nothing whilst cementing a strategic relationship in one of the world's most volatile regions. It would simultaneously advance democratic values, enhance regional security, and position the United States as the partner of choice for functional African democracies.
For a Trump administration that prides itself on transactional foreign policy and tangible results, recognition delivers immediate strategic dividends whilst cementing Trump's legacy as a champion of democracy willing to challenge failed diplomatic orthodoxies.
Why the Taiwan Model Fails: Context Matters
Taiwan operates in the relatively stable Pacific region, surrounded by functioning states and protected by American military commitments. Its limbo exists because of China, a genuine superpower whose economic and military might creates legitimate constraints on other nations' behaviour.
Somaliland, by contrast, operates in the Horn of Africa, one of the world's most dangerous regions. It is surrounded by failed states, terrorism, piracy, and trafficking networks. Yet it has maintained 34 years of stability and democratic governance without international recognition or external military guarantees.
The critical question: why should Somaliland be treated like Taiwan when the constraining factor is not a superpower but a failed state? Does the Trump administration view Somalia as possessing the economic leverage, military capability, or diplomatic influence of China? Somalia cannot even produce valid documentation for the union it claims with Somaliland.
Taiwan faces constraints from a superpower. Somaliland faces objections from a state that cannot control its own capital. These situations are categorically different and demand categorically different approaches.
Recognition as Strategic Necessity
Somaliland's need for recognition is not about prestige. It is about security for both Somaliland and the broader region.
De facto arrangements create ambiguity, and ambiguity in the Horn of Africa creates opportunity for malign actors. When Somaliland's status remains uncertain, it complicates security cooperation, limits international partnerships, and creates vulnerabilities that terrorists and traffickers exploit.
Full recognition would eliminate this ambiguity. It would enable robust security partnerships, facilitate intelligence sharing, and establish clear responsibilities for maritime security in some of the world's most important shipping lanes. The Horn of Africa shapes maritime access to the Red Sea and Suez Canal, influences counter-terrorism operations across East Africa, and affects migration patterns into Europe and the Middle East. Somaliland's stability directly serves American interests in all these domains.
The Reality of Somalilander Patience
Somaliland has waited 34 years for international recognition whilst maintaining every commitment to Western partners. This patience has been remarkable, but policy realities suggest it cannot continue indefinitely.
If American policy continues treating Somaliland as subordinate to a failed Somali state, alternatives will become increasingly attractive. China can offer infrastructure without recognition. Russia can offer security partnerships and diplomatic cover. The Gulf states can offer economic engagement without the condescension of being treated as subordinate to Mogadishu.
These alternatives become more attractive each day America delays recognition whilst demanding Somaliland maintain Western partnerships.
Note to Michael: We look forward to welcoming you back to Hargeisa, where you can witness firsthand the democratic resilience and strategic importance of this remarkable nation.